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Winter 1983

Volume 1, No. 1

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE REAGAN
ERA: A MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE*
William C. Zifchak**
American labor-management relations, in particular the institution of collective bargaining, has faced many challenges in the
twentieth century. Certainly "crisis" or "concession" bargaining, as
we have experienced recently in the bread-and-butter sectors of the
economy, is not a new phenomenon. For example, shortly after the
Korean War, unions in the garment and textile industries made
significant wage concessions. 1 Job security concerns, precipitated by
plant closings and technological changes, led to the formation of the
Armour Automation Committee in 1959.2 During the 1973-753
recession, employees in the airline industry agreed to wage freezes .
However, the challenge posed by the current economy is the most
serious one of the post-War era, and stems from the confluence of four
phenomena: first, a deep, and possibly prolonged, recession; second,
the internationalization of competition in trade and commerce,
especially with respect to commodities such as automobiles, rubber,
steel and textiles which, heretofore, were the staple of our economy;
third, rapidly advancing industrial technology; and, fourth, a bona
fide "laissez-faire" philosophy on the part of the Reagan
Administration toward industrial relations.
Copyright 1982 by William C. Zifchak
, Mr. Zifcbak received his B.A. from Harvard College in 1970, and his J.D. from Columbia
University in 1973. He is a partner in the law firm Kaye, Scholer, Fiennan, Hays and Handler,
New York, New York.
1. See Mitchell, Recent Union Contract Concessions, 38 UCLA INSTITUTE OF INDUS.
REL. WORKING SER. (Feb. 1982).
2. The Armour Automation Committee was established as part of Armour's collective
bargaining agreements with the Packinghouse and Meat Cutters Unions. Its purpose was to
cushion employees against the consequences of automation or other operational changes to the
extent possible without hampering management's flexibility. See Livingston, Avoidance and

Settlement of Strikes and Contract Disputes, 1968

PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR; G. SCHULTZ and A. WEBER, STRATEGIES FOR
THE DISPLACED WORKER (1966).

3.

Mitchell, supra note 1, at 12.
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This paper presents, from the perspective of a management
attorney, a diagnosis of the institution of collective bargaining in its
current economic and political context, a prognosis as to any
perceptible short-term or long-term trends, and will comment upon
the psychology that management is bringing to the 1982-83
bargaining table.
To summarize my views at the outset, first, the principal
consequence of the Reagan Administration's overall labor and
economic policies is that this year, and for the duration of this
Administration, virtually every negotiation will proceed sui generis.
The only "pattern" will be that there will be no "patterns," certainly
not in the traditional sense. Thus, while we will continue to see many
employers achieving necessary wage concessions, in stark contrast,
there will be many employers, sometimes in the same industry,
continuing to grant wage increases in the 7 to 9 per cent per annum
range. This scenario will also work in reverse; for example, in the
trucking industry where the wage freeze negotiated on a national
basis has been rejected on the local level in favor of even greater
concessions. 4 Second, the Administration's economic policy increasingly will compel management and labor to redirect their energies in
negotiations toward the issue of economic viability of the basic
enterprise and thus job security for the workforce. Third, the Reagan
Administration's political philosophy will cause the collective
bargaining process to assume a greater role in enforcing our labor and
fair employment laws.
THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CLIMATE FOR BARGAINING

Reagan's Labor Policy: "Laissez-Faire"
One of the few refreshing aspects of the Reagan Administration
has been its steadfast "laissez-faire" approach to private labormanagement relations and collective bargaining. President Reagan
has made it very clear that labor and management must fashion their
own solutions to their individual economic problems. 5 He has stated
publicly his opposition to corporate bail-outs such as those granted to
4. See note 61 infra.
5. Administration Sticking to Principle of Collective Bargaining Noninvolvement, 26
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-5 (Feb. 8, 1982); Donovan Rejects Government Interference in
1982 ContractTalks, 7 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-3 (Jan. 12, 1982); Lovell Counsels a Strict
Hands-Off Policy Despite GatheringPressuresfrom U.S. Intervention on COLA, 176 DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-5 (Sept. 11, 1981); Lovell Says Administration'sHands-Off Approach in
Bargaining Will Strengthen Union's Situation, 175 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-2 (September
10, 1981); Reagan Goals and Labor, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1981, at D2, col. 1.
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Lockheed and Chrysler under previous administrations. 6 He has
declined to pursue any executive or 7legislative initiatives to ease the
pressures from foreign competition.
This is the sharpest change in attitude toward labor-management
relations by a presidential administration in the past fifty years.
Presidents Roosevelt and Truman not only intervened in major labor
disputes, but their administrations set the ground rules and tone for
labor relations through legislation and executive orders. Both
administrations, faced with wars that disrupted the economy, found it
necessary to invoke wage stabilization programs. 8 While President
Eisenhower was much less active on this score, he did from time to
time appeal to industry for wage-price restraint, and intervened in a
major steel strike. 9 Under the Kennedy Administration we had
voluntary wage-price guidelines -"guideposts" -and the President
personally intervened in the steel and other disputes. The Johnson
Administration similarly resorted to guideposts and jaw-boning, and
frequently invoked the personal prestige of the President.10
President Nixon was very assertive in major labor-management
disputes, assembled a strong and aggressive Labor Department, and,
of course, imposed the first mandatory wage-price controls since the
Korean War. President Carter also resorted to ill-fated voluntary
wage-price controls and frequently resorted to jaw-boning measures.
The Reagan Administration, however, has made a sharp break
from the previously prevailing philosophy that it is essential for a
presidential administration to formulate or influence labor policy and
to impose its views, including substantive ones when necessary, on
collective bargaining. Consistent with his political and economic
philosophy, Reagan's labor policy is to leave the parties to their own
devices within the existing statutory framework. The fact that a
hands-off approach is being adhered to during a period of economic
crisis and during a critical year in the three-year bargaining cycle
accentuates this break with tradition.
This reluctance to intervene in major labor-management
disputes is not dysfunctional. It is entirely consistent with the
6. 122 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-9 (June 24, 1982). N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1982, at A22,
col. 4.
7. See, e.g., UAW Bill on Local Contentfor Autos Opposed by Administration Officials,
41 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-4 (March 24, 1982).
8. G. BLOOM AND H. NORTHRUP, ECONOMICS OF LABOR RELATIONS 462-69 (1969). See
generally P. TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR INAMERICAN HISTORY, ch. 42-44, 48 (1964).
9. D. BOK AND J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 297 (1970).
10. G. BLOOM AND H. NORTHRUP, supra note 8, at 382-85; BOK AND DUNLOP, supra
note 9, at 296-300; see generally, GUIDELINES: INFORMAL CONTROLS AND THE MARKET PLACE

(SHULTZ AND ALIBER eds. 1966).
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fundamental tenet of our national labor policy that the parties bargain
in private and reach voluntary agreement on substantive terms and
conditions of employment. In the last several months, we have seen
truly remarkable evidence that the collective bargaining process can
function in an imaginative and productive fashion in the face of
economic crisis, without the need for governmental intrusion.
Indeed, one can make a persuasive case that crisis brings out the best
in collective bargaining; it is, by definition, a problem-solving
process. Economic crisis puts great pressure on both parties to be
creative and innovative in satisfying their mutual needs. While
governmental mediation can be an important and necessary device for
helping the parties to perceive their mutual interests and thereby to
reach agreement, 1 1 I remain unconvinced that there is anything that a
national administration can contribute, substantively, to the
bargaining process. Our recent experience with wage freezes and
pay-price controls, for example, demonstrates that it is folly for an
administration to dictate contract terms.
In short, while one can make a case that President Reagan should
be taking other steps to alleviate some of the systemic pressures on
American industry and, indirectly, collective bargaining, the
determination not to interfere directly in that process is the
preferable approach. While there may come a point in the future
where presidential intervention in a labor dispute is indispensable,
the Reagan policy of laissez-faire, reversing the trend of past
Administrations, will serve as a reminder to future Administrations
that intervention should be the exception, not the rule.
Economic Policy
Unfortunately, the Administration's non-interventionist labor
relations posture has been accompanied by economic policies that,
thus far, have led us into a deep recession: industrial output is down,
112 plants were closed in the first quarter of 1982 alone, 1 2 and
unemployment is hovering near 10 percent. Some aspects of the
current economic malaise were in the making long before the election
of Ronald Reagan, however. For example, the deregulation of the

11. As a practical matter, it is relatively small business that is most adversely affected by
the laissez-faire philosophy and, in particular, the substantial personnel cutbacks at the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS). The great majority of FMCS trouble-shooting
takes place at this level. Major disputes of national scope, warranting the intervention of the
FMCS Director, are a small minority.
12. 104 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-2 (May 28, 1981).
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trucking 13 and airline industries 14 has wreaked havoc not only in
those industries, but also in those satellite industries directly
dependent upon them. Intense competition from foreign manufacturers of steel, autos, textiles and electronics is a phenomenon that
has been evolving steadily over time, but until recently industry paid
little heed.
The only good news to come out of the economy is the rapid
deceleration in, and the leveling off of, inflation. For this, the
Administration can take the lion's share of credit. Disinflation,
together with its handmaiden, increased unemployment, has had,
and will continue to have, a tremendous psychological and practical
effect at the bargaining table.
Governmental Retrenchment
The Administration's determination to cut spending on domestic
programs, notably those in the labor sector such as OSHA,15 the
NLRB, 16 and the EEOCG7-its politically motivated intention to
shrink the existing body of labor-related regulations and to ease off on
litigation to enforce remaining regulations and statutes-is also
having a substantial impact at the bargaining table. In the 1970's,
social legislation such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970,18 and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 19
relegated collective bargaining to a back seat in effecting many terms
and conditions of employment. This trend has done an about-face.
Today, many labor unions feel compelled, in the guise of private
attorneys-general, to find the means to ensure that the legislative and
13. The trucking industry was deregulated under the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1981). The Teamsters Union has lost over 500,000 members since that
time. In June 1981, the Union estimated that approximately 416 unionized motor carriers have
gone out of business since deregulation, and 100,000 union members have been laid off as a
result. 113 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-3 (June 12, 1981). At the same time, over 6,500 new
companies, largely nonunion, have been created. Nonunion Rivals and Dissent Are Troubling
Teamsters, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1982, at Al, col. 1. See note 67 infra.
14. The airlines were deregulated under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1979). See Futureof Airline Deregulation, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1972,
at 29, col. 3; Once GlamorousAirlinesA Troubled Industry, J. of Comm., Mar. 23, 1982, at 2A,
col. 3.
15. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration was created to administer the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 656 (1976).
16. The National Labor Relations Board was created in 1935 by the National Labor
Relations Act (WVaguer Act) § 451, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976).
17. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980).
18. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 1-30, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
19. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §§ 1-4082, 29 U.S.C.
§9 1001-1381 (1976).
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administrative protections existing for their members on paper
continue to be enforced in fact. Furthermore, cutbacks in other
programs, such as CETA, 20 have caused unions to look either to
collective bargaining or to the state legislatures for solutions to the
problems of employee displacement and retraining.
IMPACT ON CURRENT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

How has the political and economic setting just reviewed
affected the institution of collective bargaining? As one might expect,
quite substantially. However, there is wide variation in the degree
and nature of the impact. The strength of collective bargaining is that
every bargaining relationship, much like a marriage, is sui generis:
collective bargaining allows the parties in each relationship to
structure that relationship according to their unique mutuality of
interest. Particularly in this field, therefore, it is overly simplistic to
strain to find "trends" with universal application. The average or
mean in labor relations, the "prototypical" contract, rarely exists in
reality. To illustrate the point, the Labor Department reported that
1982 first-quarter wage increases "averaged" 2.2%; however,
factoring out the Teamsters' and Auto Workers' settlements, which
involved wage concessions, the rate of first-year wage increase for
sixty-two other major contracts was 7.8%.21 It is doubtful whether any
real-life employer in this period actually negotiated a 2.2% wage
increase. These statistics also illustrate that agreements granting
union concessions, while they monopolize the headlines, are still not
the norm.22
Nevertheless, there are certain symptoms that are appearing
with some frequency. Indeed, if the economy continues on its current
course, these symptoms will surface with greater rapidity.
Bargaining Table Dynamics
1. Shift in Psychology. There are several symptoms of a
perceptible shift in power at the bargaining table. Labor unions are
increasingly on the defensive, while management is becoming more
aggressive. Recent statistics on work stoppages show that 1981 was
the most peaceful period in many years.2 3 There is no question that
20. Comprehensive Employment and Training Act §§ 1-614, 29 U.S.C. §§ 801-992
(1976).
21. New Labor Pacts Restrict Pay Rises, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1982, at A22, col. 1.
22. See Reisel, Unnoticed - Many Strong Unions Winning Big Wage Contracts, Inside
Labor, May 5, 1982; Heavy Wage, Holiday Gains Reported in New Labor Pacts, id., Jan. 7,
1982.
23. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service Annual Report (1980) shows that the
percentage ofclosed cases involving strikes, 12.9% in fiscal 1980, was the lowest since the 11.4%
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the current bargaining climate this year is such that it has allowed for
a major increase in employer assertiveness which only a year ago
24 Increaswould have appeared unseemly and counterproductive.
ingly, employers in dire financial straits are going to their unions and
making demands to reopen existing contracts and to secure economic
in these situations have
and managerial concessions. The unions
25
quo.
status
the
of
become defenders
2. Mood of Management. The sponsors of this conference
asked me to comment on the mood among management
representatives in the current political and economic climate. While
on the one hand most employers have welcomed the laissez-faire
approach to collective bargaining, on balance, management is deeply
discouraged by economic developments. I am confident that all
employers would prefer to be in the position of deflecting union
demands to share in increasing profits, as opposed to being in a fiscal
position where they are obligated to demand concessions from the
union. While there are a few opportunistic companies that may try to
take advantage of what is perceived generally to be a period of
retrenchment for union benefits, most employers approach the
situation pragmatically. Employers who are suffering financially and
who are truly in need of concessions will seek them with considerable
vigor. Pragmatism will be the strategy for those who are doing well
and who will be most injured by a strike. Profitable employers will try
to keep increases to a minimum, not necessarily because the
bargaining climate is conducive to a good settlement, but because the
uncertain state of the economy makes it imperative.
Most union leaders have been reacting to demands for
concessions in responsible fashion; indeed, they are taking advantage
of the overall environment to secure substantial gains in job security.
This may be far more significant in the long run than wage
concessions. 26 Even with healthy employers, unions for the most part
have not been greedy, particularly where there is a wide fluctuation
in the financial status of competitors in the industry. Overall, unions
have demonstrated surprising flexibility. This is one factor that has
contributed to the demise of pattern bargaining.
figure in 1973. The number of strikes, 2764, was the lowest since 1976. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics recorded 2,577 work stoppages in calendar 1981, the lowest figure in over 30 years. In
terms of percentage of working time lost, the figure 0. 11% was the lowest since 1963. BRIEFING
SESSIONS ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WORKBOOK 17 (1982).
24. See Auto Concession Impact Debated by Economists, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1982, at

D1, col. 4.
25.

HardTimes Prompt Union Concessions, J. of Comm., Apr. 1, 1982, at 5A, col. 3.

26. Job Security and Big Wage Hikes Proposedby IUE at Start of GeneralElectric Talks,
86 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-9 (May 4, 1982).
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I should digress briefly to comment upon the impact of the
Reagan Administration's handling of the PATCO strike on collective
bargaining. In the public sector, the PATCO experience might very
well lead some employers to engage in "hard-ball" tactics. In the
private sector, on the other hand, our experience has been that
PATCO has had no real impact. While a small minority of employers
have found some fleeting solace in the President's stance toward the
Air Traffic Controllers Union, the grim reality of a recessionary
economy has dominated management's agenda.

Topics of Bargaining
Certain economic factors that now exist will be with us for so long
that many of the concepts being introduced in bargaining will become
more and more ingrained. Some of these concepts were due to
surface in any event; however, the state of the economy presided over
by the Reagan Administration is such that it has expedited that
otherwise evolutionary process.
1. Job Security. What has fast become the principal concern of
most unions is job security for the bargaining unit. The viability of the
employing enterprise is the top priority of management. 2 7 In periods
of full employment it was a rule of thumb that unions would trade
higher wage increases in exchange for layoffs of junior members,
knowing that the latter could secure employment elsewhere. Now,
however, widespread unemployment, the spectre of continuing
recession, foreign imports and the age of robots, has forced even the
most senior members of the bargaining unit to concern themselves
with job security. In almost all of the publicized cases involving
concessions, some variation on the job security concept has been
agreed to by management as a quid pro quo for concessions. Indeed,
job security has become such a prevalent subject in the wake of the
auto negotiations that many unions are seizing the initiative to secure
strong job security measures without regard to whether the employer
is demanding, or needs, concessions; for example, in the electrical
industry negotiations. 28 The implications of all of this for long-term
management flexibility is alarming: to a substantial degree employers
may be mortgaging their futures in return for short-term

27. Id.
28. ElectricalUnions Set BargainingGoals, 39 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-3 (Feb. 26,
1982); Job Security Playing More Crucial Role in 1982 Bargaining Than in Any Prior
Bargaining Round, 16 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at C-1 (Jan. 2.5, 1982).
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concessions.29 Moreover, job security commitments have been
deemed fully enforceable in a court of law. 30
Unions have not had great success in tackling the problem of job
security at the legislative level. For example, while many bills
restricting the rights of employers in closing plants have been
introduced in Congress, none have made it out of committee. 3 1 The
chances for such legislation are nonexistent under the current
Administration. 32 The "domestic content" legislation, which would
require major automobile manufacturers, both domestic and foreign,
to produce most of their automobile components in the United States,
and which had an early strong showing of support, probably will not
become law. 33 Likewise, the movement in the steel industry for
import quotas, supported by the Steelworkers Union, probably will
fail. Accordingly, unions are turning to collective bargaining for
solutions. Some of the limitations on layoffs, plant closings,
subcontracting or "outsourcing," and foreign imports that are
appearing with increasing regularity in contemporary collective
34
bargaining agreements, were unheard of only a few years ago.
29. Ford to Test Lifetime GuaranteedJobs, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1982, at D4, col. 1;
Ruggles & Kumar, The Dark Side of Ford'sContract, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1982, at A17, col. 2.
30. Recent decisions teach that employers cannot take job security guarantees cavalierly.
The Sixth Circuit has held that a publisher's promise of lifetime job security in exchange for a
union's agreement to the use of computer technology is enforceable. The court rejected the
employer's defense that the commitment did not survive the expiration of the underlying
collective bargaining agreement and, alternatively, was extinguished when the company went
out ofbusiness. Heheman v. E.W. Scripps Co., 661 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 2272 (1982). A federal district judge recently held The Singer Company liable for over $2
million in damages for reneging on a commitment to modernize its plant in exchange for union
wage concessions. Local 461, IUE v. The Singer Company, 540 F. Supp. 442 (D.N.J. 1982).
31. For example, joint committee hearings were held in the previous Congress on the
Ford-Riegle Bill (H.R. 5040, S. 1608) (96th Cong.), which would have required advance notice
of plant closing and assistance to dislocated employees and affected communities. Similar bills
are pending in the current Congress. E.g., H.R. 1037 ('Plant Relocation Bill"); H.R. 565 ("Plant
Closing Bill").
32. In contrast, two states, Maine and Wisconsin, have passed laws regulating plant
closings, and three other states, California, Minnesota, and Connecticut, have comparable
legislation under active consideration. Maine requires 60 days' notice of closings to employees,
the municipality and the state and also requires severance pay based on seniority. ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B (Supp. 1981). Wisconsin also requires 60 days' notice. Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 109.07 (West Supp. 1981). See also, State Legislatures Take Steps to Ease Impact of
Plant Closings on Communities, 23 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at C-1 (Feb. 3, 1982).
33. H.R. 5133, FairPracticesin Automotive ProductsAct, 41 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at
A-4, F-1 (Mar. 2, 1982). [eds.' note: In December, 1982, the House passed H.R. 5133.
However, the Senate's version, S. 2300 did not emerge from Committee. 242 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) at A-4 (Dec. 16, 1982).]
34. The AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department recently surveyed 101 major collective
bargaining agreements negotiated in the past two years. Seventy per cent of the agreements
contained limits on subcontracting, seventy-nine percent had clauses addressing the topics of
plant closings, work transfers, and technological change. 28 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-6
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Provision for retraining of dislocated employees is a growing trend.
This is one area where the government has a role; namely, subsidizing
such efforts in order to spread the cost of retraining over a large base
of employers. 35 Another alternative is for management to buy-out the
workforce with large severance payments or equivalent benefits.
One of the more radical approaches to the job security problem,
where the only alternatives are substantial wage concessions or plant
closing, is the sale of the facility to the workforce. This solution will
not achieve widespread popularity with big labor, however, because it
puts unions in competition with themselves. More significantly,
ownership of the means of production is a concept anathema to the
36
philosophy of the American labor movement.
2. Non-Union Workforce. In addition to initiatives in the area
of job "preservation," unions have tried to make the most out of
(Feb. 10, 1982). See also SourcingDecisions, Subadjustments, RetrainingAllowances Viewed as
Possibilities in 1982"s Job Security Negotiations, 17 DAILY LaB. REP. (BNA) at 'C-1 (Jan. 26,
1982).
Examples include: A & P's agreement with the Food and Commercial Workers to re-open
as a new subsidiary 20 to 25 stores previously closed by the company, 104 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) at B-2 (May 28, 1982); B.F. Goodrich's commitment to the Rubberworkers that its Akron
facility would remain open for the next threeyears, 85 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-10 (May 3,
1982); International Harvester's agreement with the UAW that it would give six months' notice
of permanent plant shutdowns and 60 days' notice of subcontracting decisions affecting 10% of
the workforce or 100 workers, id. at A-8; GM's rescinding of four announced plant closings, its
two-year moratorium on outsourcing-related plant closings, and its pilot "lifetime employment
guarantee" program, 58 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at E-1 (Mar. 25, 1981); the rubber industry's
agreement with URW to establish "early action committees" to deal with plant closings and a
commitment to allow the Union president "direct access" to chief executives with regard to
plant closing questions, 93 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-3 (May 13, 1982); Ford's agreement to a
two-year moratorium on outsourcing-related plant closings, and a "Guaranteed Income Stream"
for laid-off workers with more than 15 years seniority, 31 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at AA-2 (Feb.
16, 1982); the agreement by Armour & Company, which has closed 24 plants in the last 10 years
and reduced its workforce by 45% in the last 3 years, and Wilson, with the Food and
Commercial Workers, that they will not close any plants for the next 12 months, 243 DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) at AA-1 (Dec. 18, 1981).
35. Rockwell International and the UAW are setting up a pilot retraining program for
aerospace workers, funded by a $300,000 grant from the U.S. Department of Labor. 57 DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-6 (Mar. 24, 1982).
36. For example, in October 1981 General Motors sold its Clark, New Jersey bearings
plant to members of Local 736, UAW, under an employee stock ownership plan, for
$53,000,000. Serrin, In Experiment in Jersey, Workers Buy a Factory, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27,
1982, at BI, col. 1. The International opposed the deal because at the time it appeared that
General Motors was attempting to undermine its national agreement with the UAW. Id. More
recently, A & P Company has agreed to sell four stores in Philadelphia to members of the
United Food and Commercial Workers, Locals 1357 and 56, to be funded in part by company
contributions. 104 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at B-2 (May 28, 1982). National Steel has been
negotiating with the Independent Steelworkers Union as to the possibility of selling one of its
three principal steelmaking facilities to its 11,500 employees under an employee stock
ownership plan. Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1982, at 16, col. 2.
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economic adversity by seeking concessions from employers in the
area of job "acquisition." Union organizing efforts have been
experiencing decreasing success of late. With management concentrating on economic survival, it has been easier for unions to secure
pledges of employer neutrality on the issue of organization of their
non-union workers, even from employers, such as General Motors
37
and General Electric, who historically have resisted this concept.
Thus, one way unions have been coping with their own economic
problems due to the decline in dues-paying membership is by
minimizing employer opposition to renewed organizing drives. In a
variation, the Teamsters secured a commitment in the new National
Master Freight Agreement against "double-breasting," a device
whereby an employer sets up separate union and non-union
companies. 38
39
The principle of "equality of sacrice, " -a matching of union
and non-union, white collar, concessions -together with the pledges
of organizational neutrality by certain employers, will allow urlions to
make greater strides in organizing non-union, white collar
employees. Management can avoid this by instituting a policy of
"equality of job security." They must take precautions to install job
security protections equivalent to those being granted to the unions.
If a non-union worker is required to grant concessions but is receiving
no job security in exchange, he will be more receptive to
unionization, not less. It is instructive to note that for the first time in
over forty years of UAW blue-collar representation, white collar
workers at General Motors recently 40approached that union
concerning the possibility of organization.
3. Gain Sharing. Many unions have taken the opportunity to
introduce the concept of "gain sharing," that is, tying employee
compensation to corporate profits, because of current economic
conditions. Historically, "gain sharing" or profit sharing has been
37. Auto Workers Target Nonunion CM Plants, 108 DAiLY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-11
(June 4, 1982); IUE and Teamsters Seek to Expand Membership Through Neutrality Language
in 1982 Settlements, 251 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at C-1 (Dec. 31, 1981); Employer Neutrality
Agreements Seen as Sleeper Issue in 1982 Contract Talks, 248 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at C-1
(Dec. 28, 1981).
38.

23 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at D-4 (Feb. 3, 1982); 251 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at C-3

(Dec. 31, 1981).
39. Simply put, "equality of sacrifice" means that non-union white collar workers are
required to sacrifice the same wages and/or benefits as the unionized blue collar workers lose
through givebacks.
40. See UAW Targets CM Salaried Workers for All-Out Organizing Campaign, 100
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-1 (May 24, 1982); GM's Salaried Workers Reported Seeking
Union, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1982 at 8, col. 6.
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anathema to most of the labor movement, and to management as well.
In prior years, the auto industry consistently rejected the Auto
Workers' demands for profit sharing. In the auto negotiations,
however, profit sharing was an essential component of the ultimate

package at both Ford and General Motors, and has become de rigeur

in other leading concession packages. 4 1 It is too soon to tell, however,
whether profit sharing will emerge as a common employee benefit in
healthy companies; witness the strong opposition of professional
football, which remains highly profitable, to sharing a fixed
percentage of its gross receipts with the NFL Players Association. 42
In short, profit sharing may prove to be a concept that is viable
primarily where an employer is in financial straits, in order to justify a
wage freeze or roll-back by affording a form of insurance to employees
who suspect that the company may improve its financial position after
contract ratification.
4. Worker Participation. Coupled with the concepts of job
security and gain sharing is the heightened interest by unions in
participating in the affairs and decision-making of management. 4 3 The
most conspicuous example of this is the seat held by UAW President
Douglas Fraser on the board of directors of Chrysler. The Machinists
and other unions have begun to make similar demands. 4 4 While this
phenomenon originally was thought of as window-dressing, it has
triggered great interest in worker participation. Thus, labormanagement committees on such subjects as productivity, safety and
health, and quality of worlife, will emerge from the bargaining
process with more regularity. 4 5
41. Profit sharing has been linked to wage concessions in the following 1982 packages,
among others: B.F. Goodrich and Rubber Workers Local 289, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1982, at A16,
col. 5; International Harvester and UAW, 85 DAILY LAn. REP. (BNA) at A-8 (May 3, 1982); CM
and UAW, 58 DmALY LAB. REP. (BNA) at E-2 (Mar. 25, 1982); Ford and UAW, 31 DAILY LAn.
REP. (BNA) at A-3 (Feb. 16, 1982); Braniff Airlines and airline unions, 48 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) at A-2 (Mar. 12, 1981). The agreement between Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. and
the USW requires the company to contribute preferred stock to an employee trust fund equal to
the value of surrendered wages and fringes. Austin, Wheeling-Pittsburghand USW Plan Swap
of Preferredfor Wage Rise and Other Pay, Wall St. J., Mar. 29, 1982, at 4, col. 2. Similarly, the
agreement between American Motors and the UAW calls for diverting of deferred pay increases
into an "employee investment plan" that will pay off, with a minimum often percent investment
in 1985. 97 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-8 (May 19, 1982).
42. Eskenazi, N.F.L. Rebuffs PlayersAgain, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1982, at C6, col. 4.
43. See Gotbaum & Handman, Labors Business, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1982, at A31, col.
2; Serrin, Unions Yielding 'Givebacks' to Employers at Rising Rate, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1981,
at Al, col. 2.
44. Riesel, Union Chiefs DistributeWealth, Inside Labor, Apr. 29, 1982.
45. E.g., Quality of Work Life Program set up by A & P Company and UFCW Locals
1357 and 56 in Philadelphia, 104 DAiLY LAB. REP. (BNA) at B-2 (May 28, 1982); safety and
health committee established by the Clothing Manufacturers Association and the ACTWU, 90
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5. Management's Rights. In seeming conflict with the unions'
quest for a greater entrepreneurial stake and voice in the employing
enterprise, employers have been using their economic difficulties as
the rationale for recapturing important management rights which
have eroded over the years. For example, employers have used job
security as a carrot for securing greater control over staff assignments,
overtime and work rules. These 46operational changes can make an
employer more cost-competitive.
6. "Watchdog" Topics. Unions have been forced by economic
and political pressures to enforce the statutory protections built into
federal law in the last twenty years. They are using the collective
bargaining process as a lever to pressure employers into complying
with statutory and regulatory obligations. Indeed, in some cases,
unions have sought further protections. For example, OSHA
proposed in January 1982 that voluntary worker safety protection,
including joint management-worker committees, be developed as an
a7 While unions
alternative to the OSHA inspection process.
vigorously criticized this proposal, 48 they continue to negotiate the
formation of safety and health committees. The agencies and courts
have been receptive to union initiatives in this area by granting them
access to sensitive safety and health and EEO records as an adjunct to
the collective bargaining process. 4 9 With more of their members
unemployed, and the Reagan Administration declining to broaden
the scope of available relief, unions will look to employers to provide
additional support. This support will be either in the form of
supplemental unemployment compensation benefits, as in the auto
and electrical industries, or the more novel concept of job-sharing
programs.
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-8 (May 10, 1982); "quality of work life" teams established

throughout Bell Systems by Communications Workers, 81 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-3 (Apr.
27, 1982); National Carpentry Joint Occupational Safety and Health Committee set up by
Carpenters Union and three national employer contractor groups, 47 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at
A-9 (Mar. 10, 1982); labor-management participation teams set up under 1980 steel industry
agreements, Ruben, OrganizedLabor in 1981: a Shifting of Priorities,MONTHLY LAB. REV. at
22-23 (Jan. 1982).
46. Detroit Gets a Breakfrom UAW, Bus. WK., at 94 (Nov. 30, 1981).
47. King, Labor Dep't Proposes Voluntary Worker Safety Plans, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19,
1982, at A19, col. 3.
48. 72 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-5 (Apr. 14, 1982); Teamsters Express Concern over
Voluntary OSHA Compliance Plans, 38 DAILY LAB. RIEP. (BNA) at A-4 (Feb. 25, 1982).
49. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 18
(D.C. Cir. 1981), (data on distribution and advancement of women and minorities held
presumptively relevant to union's collective bargaining duties); Minnesota Mining and Mfg.
Co., 261 NLRB 2, 109 L.R.R.M. 1345 (Apr. 9, 1982) (workplace safety and health hazards are
relevant to collective bargaining, and employers must comply with union request for lists of
hazardous chemicals on the job).
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Traditionally, however, trade unions have not been comfortable
in the role of private attorneys-general. If the Reagan Administration
is replaced by a liberal Democratic administration in 1984 or 1988,
the tendency to raise fair employment and safety and health issues
should subside at most bargaining tables.
It is possible, with the shift at the NLRB toward a management
orientation that the Board may revive the Collyer5 ° doctrine of
deferral to arbitration of statutory issues that may be resolved by the
arbitrator without the necessity for unfair labor practice litigation.5 1
This, too, would place greater pressure on unions to enforce statutory
rights, because they would be obligated to arbitrate many issues of
discipline or contract construction that might otherwise be pursued
by the NLRB.
Blueprintfor Successful Concession Bargaining
Any employer who is committed to seeking substantial union
concessions would be well advised to follow the parameters observed
in the more successful negotiations:
(a) Marshall the economic facts to demonstrate the essential
need for concessions. 52 Make backup data and relevant corporate
records available at the union's request. Emphasize the prospect of
imminent operational change-layoffs, plant closings, subcontracting, or, the ultimate weapon, bankruptcy-to the extent prudent and
provable, particularly where time is of the essence and a contract
reopener is necessary. Indeed, these possible events can serve as an
artificial deadline for reaching agreement. The auto industry
negotiations demonstrated that while international union officials may
be sufficiently astute to recognize the need for concessions, they need
ammunition to help them win over the local membership and
leadership. 53 Even the dire threat of a declaration of bankruptcy may
give a union the necessary incentive -and the political leverage with
its membership-to reach an accord on concessions. 5 4
50. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
51. NLRB Should InitiateLabor DeregulationFormerBoard Chairman MillerDeclares,
70 DAILY L.A. REP. (BNA) at A-10 (Apr. 13, 1981). See generally Isaacson and Zifchak, Agency
Deferral to PrivateArbitration of Employment Disputes, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1383 (1973).
52. Requests f6r concessions-by American Airlines and Allis-Chalmers were spurned for
lack of proof of economic need. Developments in IndustrialRelations, MONTHLY LAB. REv. at
48 (Feb. 1982).
53. Holusha, Union Leaders Strain to Persuade FordRank and File, N.Y. Times, Feb.
10, 1982, at A15, col. 1.
54. The federal courts have allowed employers to repudiate collective bargaining
agreements in the course of Chapter XI proceedings upon a sufficient demonstration of need.
For example, in In re Handy Andy, No. 5-81-00737-T (Bankr. W. D. Tex. Mar. 15, 1982), the
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(b) Avoid undue emphasis on jargon such as concessions,
give-backs, or sacrifice, which immediately puts the union leadership
on the defensive. Rather, emphasize the mutual interest of labor and
management in maintaining the basic economic health, and thus the
job opportunities of the employing enterprise. Similarly, where the
negotiation is newsworthy, such as the automotive talks, avoid
negotiating through the press. Even in the best of times, it is usually
counterproductive to attempt bargaining in the press. In the sensitive
context of concession bargaining, negotiating through the media can
make it impossible to achieve an agreement.
(c) Concessions will not be forthcoming unless management
acknowledges the concept of "equality of sacrifice" throughout the
non-union, white-collar sector of the company, to help overcome the
hostility and distrust of the union. Ford Motor disarmed the UAW
with the surprise announcement in December 1981 of a reduction in
wages and benefits for its 63,000 salaried employees in North
America. 55 This contributed to a climate conducive to blue-collar
concessions. In sharp contrast, attempts at early negotiations between
International Harvester and the UAW were aborted, in part, because
the company had granted six million dollars in year-end bonuses to its
white collar managers just prior to the request. 5 6 "Equality of
sacrifice" should encompass not only the wages of non-union
employees, which more than likely would have the greatest economic
benefit for the company, but also the compensation of top
management and shareholder dividends, which, while symbolic, will
also be meaningful to unionized employees.
(d) To maximize the prospects for concessions, it is desirable to
maintain, if possible, the level of take-home pay and to impose
bankruptcy court, in permitting the debtor-in-possession to reject a collective bargaining
agreement as "onerous and burdensome" commented that "while the national labor policy may
favor the preservation of collective bargaining agreements, rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement is to be preferred if the alternative is a liquidated, defunct operation leaving
employees jobless." [eds.' note: On January 18, 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review the Third Circuit's opinion in In Re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir. 1982),
setting aside a collective bargaining agreement in a Ch. XI proceeding. 51 U.S.L.W. 3525 (U.S.
Jan. 18, 1983).]
55.

BUREAU

OF

LABOR

STATISTICS,

U.S.

DEP'T.

OF

LABOR,

Current Wage

Developments, Vol. 34, No. 1, at 2 (Jan. 1982).
56. A promise that no similar bonuses would be granted this year, coupled with a five per
cent wage cut for non-union employees, was forthcoming before the union was convinced to
reopen. Williams, Harvester: The Crisis Grows, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1982, at DI, col. 3; 46
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-7 (Mar. 9, 1982). At General Motors the company announced a
new bonus plan for executives the same day the agreement with the UAW was executed. The
Company suspended the plan for the life of the contract when the union accused it of a "double
cross." Holusha, Union View: Fair Sacrifice, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1982, at A23, col. 1.
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cost-saving measures in the areas of high-cost fringe benefits,
especially paid time-off or work rules, or, at most, to freeze or defer
scheduled pay or cost-of-living increases. General Motors' first
ill-fated attempt at reopening failed precisely for this reason. The five
dollar per hour wage cut sought from the UAW was unrealistic in view
of the Company's 1981 profit performance and the rank-and-file's
57
general distrust; thereafter, the Company's credibility decreased.
By contrast, in the settlement between Goodrich and the
Rubberworkers, URW President Stone was able to state publicly that
the agreement was reached "without concessions" from the union,
since the union exchanged general wage increases for the retention of
its symbolic COLA package; what the union "conceded" was a
58
diminution in the rate of increase in wages.
(e) Management should be prepared from the start to propose an
imaginative, realistic job security program that will soften the
opposition of the majority of bargaining unit members. This was the
case at Ford Motor, and it worked very effectively. In contrast,
requests for wage concessions by the A & P supermarket chain were
rebuffed by the United Food and Commercial Workers in April 1982
precisely because A & P refused to propose any job security
measures that would stem a recent wave of store closings. 59 Unions
increasingly are proposing job security commitments, and accordingly management, at a minimum, should analyze the various options
available prior to seeking concessions from the union and at least be
able to counter-propose a program of job security that the employer
can live with. This latter point is particularly important: it appears
that some employers are getting the short end of the concession stick
by granting overly generous and often unrealistic job security
measures in their eagerness for a "quick fix" of temporary wage
concessions.
(f) Employers may find the least resistance to requests for
concessions in the area of work rules. These changes can yield
substantial savings in unit costs which are not highly visible to the
union. For example, the United Electrical Workers finally achieved a
57. Holusha, GM Seeking to Slash Costs by $1,000 to $1,200 PerAuto, N.Y. Times, Jan.
17, 1982, at A24, col. 3.
58. 76 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-6 (Apr. 20, 1982).
59. Id. at A-1 (Apr. 20, 1982). A similar rebuff was received by Kahn's and Company, a
Cincinnati meat packer, from the UFCW. In contrast to Armour and the other industry leaders,
who offered guarantees against plant closings, Kahn's not only demanded wage and fringe
concessions but also a strong management rights clause, which implied that the Company was
free to relocate in the absence of suffcient productivity. 23 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-i (Feb.
3, 1982).
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settlement with American Standard after a seven month strike over
the issue of wage concessions. The union was successful in achieving a
$3.17 per hour wage increase over the contract term, but the
Company also achieved its objective of major concessions on
60
productivity and utilization of manpower.
(g) Management should refrain from agreeing to union proposals
which link wage concessions to a reduction in prices for the consumer,
even though this may be a tempting political solution. The UAW and
General Motors entered into such an agreement-termed an
"historic initiative" by GM Chairman Roger Smith-which was later
aborted. 6 1 Aside from the practical problems inherent in this
approach, there is serious doubt whether such an agreement would
62
survive scrutiny under the antitrust laws.
(h) Lastly, employers who have taken a mature approach to
collective bargaining, spurned posturing and invective, maintained a
continuing dialogue with their workforce and union leaders, and thus
gained their respect, have the best chance of securing concessions
when they are in trouble. Thus, International Harvester, which in the
mid-1960's had model labor relations and was able to avoid the
repeated strikes that crippled Ford and GM, had a tough time
securing concessions in 1982, even though the company was on the
verge of bankruptcy, because it had alienated the union by inducing a
six month strike in 1979.63 In contrast, Ford and UAW were able to
achieve a landmark settlement, in large part, because the chief
negotiators on each side had been laying the groundwork for several
months. 64
Short-term and Long-term Prospects
1. Pattern Bargaining. Many commentators sounded the
death knell for pattern bargaining last winter when early opening of
the auto industry negotiations was imminent and concessions
60. Serrin, ElectricalWorkers to Vote on Pact After Striking to Bar Concessions, N.Y.
Times, May 24, 1982, at A15, col. 3.
61. 7 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-11 (Jan. 12, 1982).
62. Labor's antitrust exemption extends only to agreements over mandatory subjects of
bargaining. Meat Cutters Union v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). Consumer prices are not
normally considered a mandatory subject, id at 689, and price-fixing agreements, even if
motivated by good intentions, are per se violative of the Sherman Act. United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). See generally, Handler and Zifchak,
Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws: The Emasculation of the Labor Exemption, 81
CoLTJf. L. REv. 459, 499-510 (1981).
63. Williams, Harvester: The Crisis Grows, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1982, at D1, col. 3.
64. Ford, UAV Officials Say That Japanese Trip and Employee Involvement Programs
Were CrucialFactors in Settlement, 1-02 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at C-1 (May 26, 1982).
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appeared to be in the offing. 65 In its place, we currently have
decentralized, ad hoe bargaining. However, it is doubtful that we
have seen the demise of pattern bargaining. 66 Deviations from
pattern bargaining historically have occurred in periods of economic
adversity, and this time is no exception. 67 The magnitude of deviation
is now enhanced because the recession has hit each pattern setting
industry hard during its bargaining year.
Periods of sustained economic growth and profit taking, which
have characterized the post-war economy, are conducive to pattern
bargaining. The premise of pattern bargaining is that employers have
little or no incentive to compete based upon differences in labor
standards; and unions similarly have great incentive to standardize
their members' terms and conditions, even cutting across industry
lines. Therefore, terms and conditions of employment in unionized
sectors of the economy will tend to approach a common denominator,
and employers will compete with each other on different grounds.
In contrast, in a deep recession, where each employer must
retrench in order to remain competitive and minimize losses, labor
costs are an obvious target for adjustment. They will not be adjusted
according to any rigid formula, but only so much as in each cas.e will
render the employer more comparably competitive. Given the great
disparity in economic conditions between General Motors, Ford,
Chrysler and International Harvester, traditional pattern bargaining
during the winter of 1982 in the auto and agricultural implements
industries would have been an exercise in futility. However, it should
be pointed out that in certain industries (e.g., meat packing, auto and
rubber) there has been a rough pattern to the nature of concessions
granted. Within this rough framework, each agreement has been
largely tailored to the particular employer's needs.
65. Collective BargainingPatternsExpected to Shift, J. of Comm. at 3A, col. 3 (Feb. 25,
1982); Greenberger, Economic Gloom Cuts Labor-Union Demands for Big 1982 Contracts,
Wall St. J., Sept, 30, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
66. See generally Auto Pattern Bargaining Described as 'Dead' for Industry's
Negotiations During 1982, 219 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-3 (Nov. 18, 1981).
67. This has already been the experience in the trucking industry, where as much as 75%
of the eight hundred unionized motor carriers have attempted, in local bargaining, to work out
deviations from the Mpster Freight Agreement negotiated in January, setting a precedent for
the anticipated'break-up of national bargaining two years from now. Contributing to this "every
man for himself' mentality, of course, is the deregulatory environment, which promotes local
competition frnm non-union firms. TeamstersFace Tough Choice in Ailing Trucking Climate, J.
of Comm., Apr. 29, 1982, at lA, col. 2; Spector-Red Ball Freight Closing Should ProveAid to
Industry, J.of Comm., Apr. 27, 1982 at 1A,col. 2; Chicago TeamstersAccept New Contract, 77
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-51 (Apr. 2, 1982), Trucker Walkout Could Signal Another Period
of Labor Unrest, J. of Comm. April 2, 1982, at 1A, col. 3; Salpukas, Regional Truckers Debate
Labor Costs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1982, at D1, col. 3.
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Currently, the economy is in worse shape than most observers
had anticipated. As long as this continues, there will be little or no
pattern bargaining in the traditional sense. The only "pattern" is in
the tendency toward "concession" bargaining. This pattern is a
consequence of economic forces over which no single business or
union has control. Once the economy returns to health, some form of
pattern bargaining most likely will return. The pattern-setting
industry, however, may change from the automotive industry to one
with a healthier outlook.
2. Wage and Fringe Concessions and ContractReopening. Although there is increasing evidence that employers are seeking to
achieve wage and fringe concessions from labor unions, whether in
the context of an early reopening of the contract or at the traditional
contract expiration date,6 8 Professor John Dunlop 6 9 has concluded
that the phenomenon of concessions is an aberration and that there
will be no emerging trend. In the past, employers have achieved
reopeners and wage concessions in times of economic severity. W"hile
there is no question that this is the perfect climate in which to seek
concessions, an employer still must make a persuasive demonstration
of need before a union even will consider granting concessions. The
case for concessions must be more compelling to achieve an early
reopener, as the recent rebuff by the unions in the depressed copper
industry demonstrates. 70 It is an astounding coincidence that many of
the companies that secured early concessions are in the high profile,
basic industries whose contracts were up for renegotiation in 1982. In
each case, however, the depressed state of the industry has been
undisputed. The traditional leadership role of these industries in
setting a pattern for other sectors will have some spillover effect this
year with respect to concessions, but there will be no pattern. The
majority of recent settlements have been in the seven to nine percent
range, and future settlements should remain in that range unless
inflation further abates. 71 The settlement in the troubled rubber
68. According to BNA's REPORT ON LAYOFFS, PLANT CLOSINGS AND CONCESSION
BARGAINING, FIRST QUARTER 1982, in almost 50% of collective bargaining agreements
concluded in the first three months of 1981 (those that were studied), unions agreed to either a
freeze or reduction in wages and benefits.
69. Remarks by Former Secretary of Labor Dunlop on 1982 Wage Developments, 36
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at D-1 (Feb. 23, 1982).
70. 94 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-8 (May 14, 1982).
71. E.g., the apparel industry and ILGWU -approximately 20% over three years, plus
an additional cost-of-living adjustment increase capped at 25 cents, i.e., approximately 4%, 106
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-10 (June 2, 1982); the petroleum refining industry and Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers -7.1% per year for two years, 28 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-7
(Feb. 10, 1982); railroads and national railway unions-wage and fringe increases in excess of
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industry called for cost-of-living increases over term that could exceed
twenty-five percent, hardly a sacrifice on the union's part. 72 One can
anticipate, further, that substantial wage increases will be secured in
some of the major negotiations now in progress or coming up later in
1982-for example, electrical equipment, 73 aerospace and communications.
One factor that militates against wholesale bargaining trends,
and thus universal concessions, is the cyclical nature of collective
bargaining. Most agreements run for three-year cycles. Many
employers are enduring the recession under the weight of generous
labor agreements that do not expire until 1983 or 1984: four million
workers will receive deferred wage increases in 1982 averaging 6.3%,
74
and another 3.5 million are due to receive cost-of-living increases.
This cyclical pattern injects stability into the industrial sector. It is
more important for industry to have labor stability and labor cost
certainty than to have the capacity to adapt quickly to unforeseen
fluctuations in the economy. One may take sharp issue with former
COWPS Director Barry Bosworth, who has advocated legislation
banning multi-year collective bargaining agreements. 7 5 This would
be an unmitigated disaster.
There is no question that many employers are not waiting for
contract expiration but instead are seeking early reopeners. In the
current economy, reopeners are a matter of common sense. But early
bargaining, in contrast, is a technique that has wider application. In
some cases, labor and management have resorted to early bargaining
in order to avoid a confrontational atmosphere, and probable strike, at
the contract expiration. The Experimental Negotiating Agreement,
first established in the steel industry in 1973, whereby negotiation
30% over a 39 month term, 217 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-4, (Nov. 10, 1981); Clothing
Manufacturers Association and ACTWU-15.5% plus cost-of-living adjustments over 38
months, 90 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-8 (May 10, 1982); Northwest Orient Airlines and
BRAC-7% per year for three years, 94 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-3 (May 14, 1982); United
Airlines and the Machinists Union-18% over two years, 64 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at B-2
(Apr. 2, 1982).
For the first five months of 1982, the median first-year wage gain was 7.8%. 104 DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) at B-i (May 28, 1982). The average first-year wage increase negotiated in
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impasses were to be submitted to an impartial panel, is a notable
example. The industry has requested early bargaining and it should
prove interesting to see whether ENA, which was dropped in 1980,
vill be revived. In the longshoring industry, the shippers and the
International Longshoremen's Association used early bargaining in
1980 for the first time in history, and were successful in avoiding a
strike for only the second time in twenty years. Teddy Gleason of the
ILA made clear that the union welcomed early bargaining for the
76
1983 agreement.
In either context -concessions or strike-avoidance -successful
early reopening is best predicated on a good bargaining relationship
with the union. Confrontation bargaining is often a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
3. Job Security. Unquestionably, job security is, and will
remain for many years, a principle issue in most negotiations. It is an
area that many unions previously had neglected. All of the factors
which were mentioned at the outset that have contributed to the
economic predicament of industry are long-term, intractable
conditions. It will take great wisdom and imagination on the part of
government and industry to grapple with such issues as foreign
competition and automation. In the interim, union membership will
be demanding immediate solutions at the bargaining table. The
challenge to management will be formidable: to grant only so much
job security as it can expect realistically to afford in a period of
economic adversity.
4. Future of COLA and GAL. In the current economic slump,
there is less incentive for unions to push for COLA. In the past these
escalator clauses, especially in conjunction with negotiated actual
percentage increases, have pushed wages and related fringes through
the roof in many industries. As a consequence, employers in those
industries are being priced out of domestic markets. This year,
however, COLA and similar automatic wage increases, such as the
UAW's guaranteed annual increase (GAI), have been a logical target
for concessions. In major 1982 negotiations, the unions have either
deferred or waived COLA increases or, conversely, preserved them
in exchange for a waiver of scheduled wage increases. Thus, at Ford,
GM and American Motors, the UAW deferred cost-of-living increases
but suspended GAI entirely for the life of the contract. The Rubber
Workers and the Teamsters preserved COLA increases but gave up
traditional non-COLA wage increases. The Machinists Union and
United Airlines eliminated COLA while granting regular annual wage
76.
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increases. Thus, the inflationary "double-dip" syndrome was broken
ineach case.
The question is raised whether current economic trends,
together with the movement for concessions, will lead to the demise
of the COLA concept. There are some who view the notion of
"automatic" COLA increases as the antithesis of, indeed a substitute
for, collective bargaining. They are hopeful that the trend in favor of
such formulas has ended. Conversely, one can well argue that in
periods of rampant inflation, COLA has proved an effective safety
valve for avoiding labor unrest and thus preserving the stability of
multi-year labor agreements. Of course, viewing industry as a whole,
the price of that stability may be added inflation.
The current generation of workers is so imbued with the
phenomenon of inflation and the COLA concept, and is sufficiently
skeptical that inflation will ease for any length of time, that unions will
continue to press for the COLA principle. In the automotive
negotiations, COLA was deferred but not written out of the contract.
This was the pattern in many other negotiations. From management's
point of view, the current economic climate is a good opportunity to
attempt to tighten or eliminate COLA.
5. The Role of the States. One noteworthy development in
response to the leadership vacuum of the Reagan Administration may
be a growing willingness of state governments to intervene in crisis
situations. Several states have passed legislation regulating plant
closings. This trend will continue. Shortly after the recent
International Harvester negotiations, it was announced that the State
of Indiana had put together a $9.2 million loan guarantee package to
keep open the company's truck-manufacturing facility in Fort
Wayne. 7 7 Similar negotiations took place with the State of Ohio. It is
likely that the states will begin to assert more of a leadership role in
this area.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, while the current Administration has contributed
to the economic difficulties facing labor and management in this
bargaining year, it has had the good sense not to interfere, but to
allow the parties to reach an accommodation to their difficulties
through collective bargaining. And while I am not optimistic about
our current economic problems, I am confident that the collective
bargaining process will continue to yield constructive solutions to
these problems. It is up to management and labor to use the process
wisely.
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